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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY JEAN GALBRAITH*
In this section:
• United States and United Kingdom Sign the First Bilateral Agreement Pursuant to the
CLOUD Act, Facilitating Cross-Border Access to Data
• United States Remains in the Universal Postal Union, Rescinding Its Notice of
Withdrawal
• United States Gives Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Agreement on Climate Change
• Trump Administration Continues Trade Negotiations with Major Trade Partners
• United States Withdraws Troops from Syria, Leaving Kurds Vulnerable

* Karlos Bledsoe, Emily Friedman, Emily Kyle, Beatrix Lu, Rebecca Wallace, and Howard Weiss contributed to
the preparation of this section.
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
United States and United Kingdom Sign the First Bilateral Agreement Pursuant to the CLOUD
Act, Facilitating Cross-Border Access to Data
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.80
On October 3, 2019, the United States and the United Kingdom reached a bilateral agreement to facilitate more efﬁcient data access between the two countries for law enforcement
purposes. The Agreement on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious
Crime (U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement) was signed by U.S. Attorney General William Barr
and UK Home Secretary Priti Patel.1 This is the ﬁrst such agreement made by the United
States after the passage of the 2018 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD)
Act, which authorizes and structures future bilateral agreements on data sharing. Pursuant
to the CLOUD Act, Congress has 180 days following receipt of a notiﬁcation regarding
the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement to block its entry into force via a joint resolution,
which would require a majority vote in both houses of Congress and either presidential
signature or a subsequent congressional override of a presidential veto.
Cross-border data requests for law enforcement purposes have traditionally depended on
mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). Obtaining data through the processes established in
MLATs can take many months.2 In 2018, Congress passed the CLOUD Act which, among
other things, creates “a framework that allows U.S. service providers to disclose U.S.-stored data
to certain foreign countries pursuant to lawful foreign orders.”3 Under this framework, the United
States may enter into bilateral agreements with “rights-respecting countries that abide by the rule of
law” whom the attorney general has determined meet certain speciﬁed statutory criteria.4 Once
such a bilateral agreement is in force, it has the effect of “lift[ing] any restrictions under
U.S. law on companies disclosing electronic data directly to foreign authorities for covered
orders in investigations of serious crimes”—an effect that “would permit U.S.-based global
[communications service providers] to respond directly to foreign legal process in many circumstances.”5 Similarly, the bilateral agreements contemplated by the CLOUD Act can lift
1

Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the United States of America on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious
Crime (Oct. 3, 2019), available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/ﬁle/836969/CS_USA_6.2019_Agreement_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_USA_
on_Access_to_Electronic_Data_for_the_Purpose_of_Countering_Serious_Crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G9EZ-GSUR] [hereinafter U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement].
2
See Peter Swire & Justin D. Hemmings, Mutual Legal Assistance in an Era of Globalized Communications: The
Analogy to the Visa Waiver Program, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 687, 708 (2017) (noting that on average,
successful requests for data made pursuant to MLATs take ten months once requests are made).
3
Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 487, 487 (2018). The CLOUD Act also
amended a federal statute to make clear that U.S. law enforcement could use warrants to obtain electronic data
stored overseas by U.S. companies—an amendment that rendered moot a pending Supreme Court case on the
issue. See id. at 488–89.
4
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROMOTING PUBLIC SAFETY, PRIVACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW AROUND THE WORLD: THE
PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE CLOUD ACT 4, 6, 10 (Apr. 2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/ﬁle/1153446/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/PK9F-84A5]
[hereinafter DOJ White Paper on CLOUD Act]; see also Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD)
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b) (2018), available at https://www.justice.gov/dag/page/ﬁle/1152896/download
[hereinafter CLOUD Act].
5
DOJ White Paper on CLOUD Act, supra note 4, at 4.
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restrictions under the law of the partner nation that might otherwise complicate the ability of
U.S. law enforcement to gain access to data.6 The CLOUD framework thus provides an additional, more efﬁcient path to data sharing without eliminating prior protocols such as
MLATs.7 Both the CLOUD Act and the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement had the strong
support of UK law enforcement ofﬁcials.8
As the ﬁrst international agreement made by the United States pursuant to the CLOUD
Act, the text of the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement may become a model for similar agreements in the future. Article 1 provides deﬁnitions, including one on the threshold issue of
what constitutes a “serious crime”—a term that was left undeﬁned in the CLOUD Act.9
The purpose of the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, given in Article 2, is:
[T]o advance public safety and security, and to protect privacy, civil liberties, and an open
Internet, by resolving potential conﬂicts of legal obligations when communications
service providers are served with Legal Process from one Party for the production or
preservation of electronic data, where those providers may also be subject to the laws
of the other Party.10
Article 3 sets forth the core requirement that neither country’s domestic laws shall prevent one
of its companies from responding to appropriate data requests from the other country.11
Article 4 speciﬁes who are appropriate underlying targets of data requests, making clear
that the United Kingdom cannot intentionally target U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents,
or persons on U.S. territory, and conversely that the United States cannot intentionally target
persons on UK territory.12 Articles 5 through 10 provide further substantive and procedural
6
See id. at 4–5 (noting, however, that “the United States currently receives many more requests for electronic
data than it submits to other countries,” presumably because many communications service providers are based in
the United States).
7
STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45173, CROSS-BORDER DATA SHARING UNDER THE CLOUD
ACT 23 (Apr. 23, 2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45173.pdf [https://perma.cc/X49CFJHE](observing that “[e]xecutive agreements authorized by the CLOUD Act would supplement, not replace,
existing avenues of international data sharing” and “[a]ccordingly, requests for assistance would still be available
through MLATs (when in effect)”).
8
See Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facilitating Cooperation and Protecting Rights:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017);
UK Government Press Release, UK and US Sign Landmark Data Access Agreement (Oct. 4, 2019), at https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-sign-landmark-data-access-agreement [https://perma.cc/2458-WB4C].
The press release issued by the government of the United Kingdom following the signature of the U.S.-UK
Data Access Agreement noted that: “The UK has obtained assurances which are in line with the government’s
continued opposition to the death penalty in all cases.” Id.; see also U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, supra
note 1, Art. 8(4) (setting up special requirements where the United States is seeking data access for purposes of
a death penalty case and where the United Kingdom is seeking access for purposes of a case that “raises freedom of
speech concerns for the United States”).
9
U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 1(5), 1(14) (establishing that “Covered Offense means
conduct that, under the law of the Issuing Party, constitutes a Serious Crime, including terrorist activity” and
“Serious Crime means an offense that is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least three
years”); CLOUD Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(a) (failing to deﬁne “serious crimes” in the deﬁnitions section).
10
U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 2.
11
Id. Art. 3.
12
Id. Art. 4; see also UK Home Ofﬁce, Explanatory Memorandum to the Agreement between the Government
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of
America on Access to Electronic Data for the Purpose of Countering Serious Crime, Cm. 178, at 14 (2018),
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ukusa-agreement-on-access-to-electronic-data-for-the-purpose-
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rules for data requests, including ones intended to advance privacy interests.13 As one notable
example, Article 5 provides that “[o]rders subject to this Agreement shall be subject to review
or oversight under the domestic law of the Issuing Party by a court, judge, magistrate, or other
independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding, enforcement of the Order.”14
Article 11 stresses “[c]ompatibility and [n]on-exclusivity” with respect to existing
MLATs.15 Articles 12 through 16 describe implementation procedures, including with
respect to entry into force, responsibility for costs, and the process for amendments.16
Finally, Article 17 sets forth an initial ﬁve-year term for the agreement, subject to mutually
agreed-upon renewal, and separately provides that either party may terminate at any time on
one month’s notice.17
For the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement to enter into force, the parties must exchange
diplomatic notes to that effect.18 For the United States, this process will take at least 180
days from when Congress receives ofﬁcial notiﬁcation of the signed agreement and also
receives a certiﬁcation by the attorney general that the UK is an appropriate bilateral partner
for purposes of agreements made pursuant to the CLOUD Act.19 The CLOUD Act further
sets forth streamlined procedures for consideration of such executive agreements by the
House of Representatives and the Senate, including provisions ensuring that appropriately
introduced joint resolutions of disapproval will receive up-or-down votes following committee review.20 Some privacy advocates have urged the pursuit of such a joint resolution, arguing
among other things that the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement has too low a standard for

of-countering-serious-crime-cs-usa-no62019 [ https://perma.cc/XE4S-4W5A] (indicating the restriction on
intentional targeting by the United States was limited to those on the UK’s territory rather than also including
UK citizens because of “EU law which prohibits discrimination in treatment between citizens of different member
states.”).
13
U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, supra note 1, Arts. 5–10.
14
Id. Art. 5(2). Earlier in 2019, the United Kingdom passed an act setting forth a domestic process by which
such court orders could be obtained. See UK Government Press Release, Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill
Receives Royal Assent (Feb. 12, 2019), at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/crime-overseas-productionorders-bill-receives-royal-assent [https://perma.cc/6H7B-QUJ5]. The U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement also
provides that the issuing nations may neither issue requests on behalf of third-party nations nor share data
with third-party nations, U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, supra note 1, Arts. 5(4), 8(2); that a provider receiving
service of process has the right to challenge an order “when it has reasonable belief that the Agreement may not
properly be invoked with regard to the Order,” id. Art. 5(11–12); and that there should be “minimization procedures” whereby the UK will “minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of information concerning
U.S. Persons acquired pursuant to an Order,” id. Art. 7.
15
Id. Art. 11.
16
Id. Arts. 12–16.
17
Id. Art. 17; see also CLOUD Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(e)(1) (providing that the attorney general must renew
on ﬁve-year bases the determination that the other country is an appropriate partner for purposes of executive
agreements made pursuant to the CLOUD Act).
18
U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 16. It is unclear whether Brexit, should it occur, would
impact the timeline. Following Brexit, the UK might need to undergo an “adequacy determination” by EU ofﬁcials to determine the adequacy of UK data privacy and security before data is permitted to be moved between the
UK and EU member states. Kurt Wimmer & Joseph Jones, Brexit and Implications for Privacy, 40 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 1553, 1558–59 (2017). It is unclear the extent to which, should such an adequacy determination need to
occur, an agreement like the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement might be relevant to that determination.
19
CLOUD Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(2).
20
Id., § 2523(d)(5)–(6); see also id., § 2523(d)(4) (providing that such a resolution can be introduced in either
house by the majority or minority leader or, in the Senate, by the designee of one of these leaders).
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triggering data gathering, including wiretaps, and does not clearly specify that judicial oversight must occur prior to data collection.21
Overall, the CLOUD Act set the stage for a shift away from the traditional MLATs, and the
U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement begins the implementation of this shift. As the ﬁrst bilateral
CLOUD Act agreement, it may serve as a model for future such agreements. The U.S. attorney general and Australian minister for home affairs announced on October 7, 2019, that the
two nations are formally negotiating an agreement under the CLOUD Act.22 Additionally, in
June of 2019, the Council of the European Union formally authorized the European
Commission to “open negotiations for an agreement between the Union and the United
States of America on cross-border access by judicial authorities in criminal proceedings to
electronic evidence held by a service provider.”23

United States Remains in the Universal Postal Union, Rescinding Its Notice of Withdrawal
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.84

On September 25, 2019, the Third Extraordinary Congress of the Universal Postal Union
(UPU) adopted a proposal on terminal dues rates—a decision that led the United States to
remain a member state. The United States had given its one-year notice of withdrawal from
the UPU eleven months earlier, citing concerns that the existing system unfairly advantaged

21
Coalition letter from EPIC et. al. to U.S. Members of Congress (Oct. 29, 2019), available at https://www.
whistleblower.org/sign-on-letter/sign-on-coalition-statement-re-u-s-u-k-cloud-act-executive-agreement [https://
perma.cc/9Y67-P3XT] (observing that “the text of the U.S.-U.K. Agreement requires that orders for content,
widely considered the most sensitive electronic data, only meet the standard of ‘reasonable justiﬁcation based
on articulable and credible facts, particularly, legality, and severity’” and stating that this “standard is vague . . .
and likely is weaker than probable cause in various contexts”). By contrast, Jennifer Daskal and Peter Swire
describe the U.S.-UK Data Access Agreement and the underlying CLOUD Act as “positive developments that
protect privacy and civil liberties, accommodate divergent norms across borders, and respond to the reality that
digital evidence critical even to wholly local crimes is often located across international borders.” Jennifer Daskal &
Peter Swire, The UK-US CLOUD Act Agreement Is Finally Here, Containing New Safeguards, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 8,
2019), at https://www.justsecurity.org/66507/the-uk-us-cloud-act-agreement-is-ﬁnally-here-containing-newsafeguards.
22
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Joint Statement Announcing United States and Australian Negotiation of
a CLOUD Act Agreement by U.S. Attorney General William Barr and Minister for Home Affairs Peter Dutton
(Oct. 7, 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/joint-statement-announcing-united-states-and-australiannegotiation-cloud-act-agreement-us [https://perma.cc/MH2H-ZVEX].
23
Council of the European Union, Council Decision Authorising the Opening of Negotiations with a View to
Concluding an Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on Cross-Border
Access to Electronic Evidence for Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, COPEN 268 USA 45, 10128/19
(June 12, 2019), available at https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10128-2019-INIT/en/pdf
[https://perma.cc/2XJF-KUZC]; cf. European Data Protection Supervisor, Initial Legal Assessment of the
Impact of the US CLOUD Act on the EU Legal Framework for the Protection of Personal Data and the
Negotiations of an EU-US Agreement on Cross-Border Access to Electronic Evidence (July 10, 2019), available
at https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/ﬁles/ﬁles/ﬁle2/edpb_edps_joint_response_us_cloudact_annex.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2FY7-YWYB] (assessing some legal issues related to the CLOUD Act and its interaction with the
EU’s General Data Protection Regulation).
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certain developing nations, including China. Following the UPU’s decision, the United
States rescinded its notice of withdrawal. Under the new system, the United States can
begin self-posting terminal dues rates in July 2020.
On August 23, 2018, President Trump issued a memorandum laying out the priorities of
the administration in its negotiations at the UPU.1 This memorandum focused on the rates
that post ofﬁces in different countries charge each other for the delivery of international mail.
Under the existing UPU framework, which stemmed back to 1969, terminal due rates were
based on a country classiﬁcation system whereby developed nations such as the United States
paid more than developing nations.2 In the memorandum, Trump expressed concern about
this system and stated:
(A) the United States, along with other member countries of the UPU, is in many cases
not fully reimbursed by the foreign postal operator for the cost of delivering foreignorigin letter post items, which can result in substantial preferences for foreign mailers
relative to domestic mailers;
(B) the current terminal dues rates undermine the goal of unrestricted and undistorted
competition in cross-border delivery services because they disadvantage non-postal
operators seeking to offer competing collection and outward transportation services
for goods covered by terminal dues in foreign markets; and
(C) the current system of terminal dues distorts the ﬂow of small packages around the
world by incentivizing the shipping of goods from foreign countries that beneﬁt
from artiﬁcially low reimbursement rates.3
The memorandum also observed that if U.S. concerns were not promptly addressed by the
UPU, the United States would “consider taking any appropriate actions” to ensure its criteria
were met.4
While Trump’s memorandum did not discuss China by name, his concerns had particular
resonance with respect to that country. Peter Navarro, the White House director of trade and
manufacturing policy, later wrote in an opinion piece:
[U]nder the [UPU]’s antiquated “terminal dues” system, the United States Postal Service
was being forced to subsidize a ﬂood of small packages, primarily from China, at an
annual cost in the neighborhood of $500 million.

1
Modernizing the Monetary Reimbursement Model for the Delivery of Goods Through the International
Postal System and Enhancing the Security and Safety of International Mail, 83 Fed. Reg. 183 (Aug. 23, 2018)
[hereinafter Presidential Memorandum].
2
See id.; Universal Postal Union, About Terminal Dues and Transit Charges, at http://www.upu.int/en/activities/terminal-dues-and-transit-charges/about-terminal-dues-and-transit-charges.html [https://perma.cc/5ZUZQPZT].
3
Presidential Memorandum, supra note 1.
4
Id. For more information, see Eliot Kim, Withdrawal from the Universal Postal Union: A Guide for the
Perplexed, LAWFARE (Oct. 31, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/withdrawal-universal-postal-union-guideperplexed.
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This forced subsidy gave China an unfair advantage against American manufacturers and
workers . . . .5
Several months after Trump’s memorandum, the UPU held its Second Extraordinary
Congress.6 Following unsuccessful negotiations, on October 15, 2018, Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo notiﬁed the UPU that the United States “hereby denounces the UPU
Constitution and, thereby, withdraws from the Universal Postal Union. Pursuant to
Article 12 of the Constitution, the withdrawal of the United States shall be effective one
year after the day on which you receive this notice of denunciation.”7 The United States
was a founding member of the UPU, as a signatory to the 1874 Treaty of Berne,8 and had
an “unbroken record of participation” in it.9 In a statement regarding the withdrawal, the
Trump administration announced that “the Department of State will seek to negotiate bilateral and multilateral agreements that resolve the problems discussed in the Presidential
Memorandum. If negotiations are successful, the administration is prepared to rescind the
notice of withdrawal and remain in the UPU.”10 Media reports characterized the exit as
another move in growing trade tensions with China.11
After the United States gave its notice of withdrawal, the UPU called for a Third
Extraordinary Congress, as recommended by the UPU’s Council of Administration.12 The
Third Extraordinary Congress convened in Geneva, Switzerland, from September 23–26,
2019.13 Leading the negotiations for the United States, Navarro offered support for two
potential resolutions with respect to terminal dues rates: ﬁrst for a measure where “all members of the UPU would be allowed to immediately self-declare rates;”14 or second for a
5
Peter Navarro, Opinion, The Trump Guide to Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2019), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/10/15/opinion/trump-universal-postal-union.html.
6
The UPU can call an Extraordinary Congress outside of its usual four-year sessions with the consent of twothirds of its member countries. Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, Art. 15, July 10, 1964, 16 UST 1291,
611 UNTS 7. The First Extraordinary Congress was held in 1900 and, in 2016, the UPU decided to hold a Second
Extraordinary Congress in 2018. Universal Postal Union, 2018 Extraordinary Congress, at http://www.upu.int/en/
the-upu/congress/past-congresses/2018-extraordinary-congress.html [https://perma.cc/73JJ-BSY2].
7
U.S. STATE DEP’T, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113–14 (2018), available at
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2018-Digest-Chapter-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG5DPS56]; see also Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL, 136–37 (2019) (providing
more detail).
8
See Galbraith, supra note 7, at 138 (also noting that the United States joined the Treaty of Berne “not via the
advice and consent of the Senate, but rather as an ex ante congressional-executive agreement that relied on preexisting authority delegated by Congress to the president and the post-master general”).
9
Presidential Memorandum, supra note 1.
10
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-38 [https://perma.cc/LQ8V-BAHR].
11
See, e.g., Glenn Thrush, Trump Opens New Front in His Battle With China: International Shipping, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/us/politics/trump-china-shipping.html;
Danielle Paquette, Trump Ditches 144-Year-Old Postal Pact that Boosts Chinese Retailers, WASH. POST (Oct. 17,
2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-ditches-144-year-old-postal-pact-thatboosts-chinese-retailers/2018/10/17/88aefea6-d234-11e8-8c22-fa2ef74bd6d6_story.html; see also Galbraith,
supra note 7, at 132.
12
Universal Postal Union, About Congress, at http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/congress/about-congress.html
[https://perma.cc/8D65-BQ95].
13
Id.
14
U.S. Mission to Int’l Orgs. in Geneva Press Release, Peter Navarro, Assistant to the President & Dir. of the
Ofﬁce of Trade and Mfg. Policy, Remarks Before the Universal Postal Union Third Extraordinary Congress (Sept.
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“multispeed option,” which “would allow the United States to immediately self-declare rates
while other countries would achieve that goal over a ﬁve-year period.”15 The option preferred
by the United States, to immediately move for self-declared rates, was rejected by the UPU
Congress on the ﬁrst day of the session by a vote of 78–57.16 China was amongst those countries opposing this option.17
The next day, on September 25, the UPU membership unanimously adopted a proposal
along the lines of the other option proposed by Navarro.18 The UPU press release announcing the adoption of this proposal stated:
The agreement approved by acclamation by member countries on 25 September sees the
UPU accelerate rate increases to the system for remunerating the delivery of inbound
international bulky letters and small packets. Self-declared rates are to be phased in starting as soon as 2020.
Under the agreed solution, member countries that meet certain requirements – including
inbound letter-post volumes in excess of 75,000 metric tonnes—would be able to opt-in
to self-declare their rates starting 1 July 2020. Thresholds are included to protect lowvolume, developing countries from the impact of the swift reform.19
Media reports indicate that the United States, which has above 75,000 tons of mail imports,
can start setting its rates on July 1, 2020, and other high-volume importers can start implementing their own rates in 2021 with a ﬁve-year phase-in period.20 Following the proposal’s
adoption, the United States gave formal notice that it would remain in the UPU.21
China expressed support for “‘a positive solution and compromise in the spirit of UPU.’”22
The Chinese Postal Bureau Deputy Director Gao Hongtao stated that China expected to pay
almost triple for terminal dues in the future and that this would “‘push up the cost of

24, 2019), at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/09/24/remarks-of-peter-navarro-before-the-universal-postalunion-third-extraordinary-congress [https://perma.cc/S76M-X4ML].
15
Id.
16
Jamey Keaten, World Postal Union Rejects Trump’s Favored Reform Platform, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 24, 2019), at
https://apnews.com/30d73d7eb31241709ea3aee64afb23bb.
17
Id.
18
See Universal Postal Union Press Release, UPU Third Extraordinary Congress Wraps with Strong Solidarity
Message (Sept. 26, 2019), at http://news.upu.int/no_cache/nd/upu-third-extraordinary-congress-wraps-withstrong-solidarity-message [https://perma.cc/B9S5-HWKW] [hereinafter UPU Press Release]; U.S. Mission to
Int’l Orgs. in Geneva Press Release, Peter Navarro, Assistant to the President & Dir. of the Ofﬁce of Trade
and Mfg. Policy, Press Statement (Sept. 25, 2019), at https://geneva.usmission.gov/2019/09/25/58203
[https://perma.cc/Q3P9-AYT2].
19
UPU Press Release, supra note 18.
20
Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Postal Union Clinches Deal to Keep U.S. in Club, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2019), at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-un-postal/un-postal-union-clinches-deal-to-keep-us-in-club-idUSKBN1WA247. For
more details on the speciﬁcs, see Universal Postal Union, Option V – Moving Towards Self-Declared Rates,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2019), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼WOZJV6HunYQ.
21
Universal Postal Union Press Release, UPU Head Meets with US President Following Geneva Agreement on
Remuneration Rates (Oct.16, 2019), at http://news.upu.int/no_cache/nd/upu-head-meets-with-us-presidentfollowing-geneva-agreement-on-remuneration-rates [https://perma.cc/2FLB-LZQC].
22
Nebehay, supra note 20 (quoting a member of the Chinese delegation to the UPU).

132

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Vol. 114:1

cross-border e-commerce logistics in China, bringing a certain impact,’” but that the impact
would be small as China would also receive a greater amount in terminal dues.23
Since Trump took ofﬁce, the United States has withdrawn from a number of international
agreements, including the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the United Nations
Educational, Scientiﬁc and Cultural Organization.24 Unlike with the UPU, the notices of
withdrawal given with respect to these agreements did not lead to renegotiation and the rescission of the withdrawals. Media reports indicate that the administration is considering withdrawing from yet another multilateral treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, which allows parties to
engage in unarmed surveillance missions over each other’s territories.25

INTERNATIONAL OCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
United States Gives Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Agreement on Climate Change
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.82

On November 4, 2019, the Trump administration notiﬁed the United Nations that
the United States was withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, prompting expressions of
regret from a number of countries. Although President Trump had announced in June
2017 that the United States intended to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, its terms
had prevented the United States from giving formal notice of withdrawal until
November 4, 2019. The withdrawal will take effect on November 4, 2020.
Domestically, the governors of many U.S. states responded to the withdrawal by reafﬁrming their commitment to the goals of the Paris Agreement, consistent with recurring
tensions between the Trump administration and progressive states with respect to climate. In another major manifestation of these tensions, on October 23, 2019, the
United States sued California over the state’s cap-and-trade agreement with Quebec,
Canada, alleging that this agreement is an unconstitutional exercise of foreign affairs
powers.
Opened for signature in April of 2016, the Paris Agreement seeks to maintain the
global average temperature “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e]
efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”1 Each
state party is required to “prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally
23
China Says Postal Fees to Rise After US Complaint, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct. 15, 2019), at https://apnews.com/
1e7020752c854accb3279aaba52cfb14.
24
For more details, see generally Galbraith, supra note 7; Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United
States, 112 AJIL 107 (2018).
25
David Welna, Closing the Open Skies, NPR (Nov. 3, 2019), at https://www.npr.org/2019/11/03/
775818736/closing-the-open-skies.
1
Paris Agreement, Art. 2(1)(a), opened for signature Apr. 22, 2016, TIAS No. 16-1104.
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determined contributions [NDCs] that it intends to achieve.”2 Additionally, under the
Paris Agreement, “[d]eveloped country Parties shall provide ﬁnancial resources to assist
developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the [United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change].”3 The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, thirty
days after ﬁfty-ﬁve nations became party to it.4 Currently, there are 187 parties to the
Paris Agreement.5
The United States signed the Paris Agreement on April 22, 2016,6 and deposited its instrument of acceptance on September 3, 2016.7 In having the United States join the Paris
Agreement, the Obama administration acted without seeking or receiving speciﬁc congressional authorization to do so, concluding that the executive branch had the domestic authority to make this commitment on behalf of the United States.8 In its 2016 NDC, the United
States pledged to “reduc[e] its greenhouse gas emissions by 26–28 per cent below its 2005
level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%.”9
In June 2017, Trump announced that “the United States [would] withdraw from the Paris
climate accord . . . but begin negotiations to reenter either the Paris accord or an . . . entirely
new transaction on terms that are fair to the United States, its businesses, its workers, its people, its taxpayers.”10 He stated that the United States was “ceas[ing] all implementation of the
2

Id. Art 4(2).
Id. Art. 9(1).
4
Depositary Notiﬁcation, Sec’y-Gen. of UN, Paris Agreement, Paris, Dec. 12, 2015, Entry into Force (Oct. 5,
2016), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.735.2016-Eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VAX7-2RP5] [hereinafter Paris Agreement Depositary Notiﬁcation, Entry into Force].
5
Depository Status for the Paris Agreement, Sec’y-Gen. of UN, available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&lang=_en&clang=_en [https://perma.
cc/NQF6-2T5Y].
6
Id.
7
Depositary Notiﬁcation, Sec’y Gen. of UN, Paris Agreement, Paris, Dec. 12, 2015, United States of America:
Acceptance (Sept. 3, 2016), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/CN.612.2016-Eng.
pdf [https://perma.cc/8K2E-B5QG].
8
See White House Press Release, Press Brieﬁng by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, Deputy NSA for Strategic
Communications Ben Rhodes, Senior Advisor Brian Deese and Deputy NSA for International Economics Wally
Adeyemo (Aug. 29, 2016), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2016/08/29/press-brieﬁngpress-secretary-josh-earnest-deputy-nsa-strategic [http://perma.cc/YD9B-UFX5] (“[T]he Paris agreement is an
executive agreement. And so the President will use his authority that has been used in dozens of executive agreements
in the past to join and formally deposit our instrument of acceptance and therefore put our country as a party to the
Paris agreement.”); U.S. State Dep’t Press Release, Senior State Department Ofﬁcial on the Paris Agreement Signing
Ceremony (Apr. 20, 2016), at https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/256415.htm [http://perma.cc/
MK3F-8MKF] (“With respect to the Paris agreement . . . we have a standard State Department exercise that we
are currently going through for authorizing an executive agreement . . . .”). In reporting the Agreement to Congress,
the Obama administration cited a number of sources of legal authority for concluding it as an executive agreement,
including the preexisting United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. See Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1250 (2018).
9
United States, First NDC Submission (2016), available at https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/
PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPB7-B2AX]; United States, UNFCCC: NDC Registry (Interim), at https://www4.u
nfccc.int/sites/NDCStaging/Pages/Party.aspx?party=USA [https://perma.cc/6V7P-YZPV].
10
Remarks Announcing United States Withdrawal from the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change Paris Agreement, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (June 1) [hereinafter Trump Statement of
June 2017]. For discussion of the 2017 announcement of withdrawal, see generally Kristina Daugirdas &
Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL 1014, 1036–44 (2017).
3
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nonbinding Paris accord and the draconian ﬁnancial and economic burdens the agreement
imposes on our country.”11 Since Article 28(1) of the Paris Agreement prevents parties from
giving formal notice of withdrawal until three years after the Agreement’s entry into force, the
earliest possible date for such notice was November 4, 2019.12
On November 4, 2019, the United States formally notiﬁed the United Nations that it
would be withdrawing from the Paris Agreement.13 Secretary of State Michael Pompeo
explained that the United States was withdrawing
because of the unfair economic burden imposed on American workers, businesses, and
taxpayers by U.S. pledges made under the Agreement. The United States has reduced all
types of emissions, even as we grow our economy and ensure our citizens’ access to affordable energy. . . .
The U.S. approach incorporates the reality of the global energy mix and uses all energy
sources and technologies cleanly and efﬁciently, including fossils fuels, nuclear energy,
and renewable energy. In international climate discussions, we will continue to offer a
realistic and pragmatic model—backed by a record of real world results—showing innovation and open markets lead to greater prosperity, fewer emissions, and more secure
sources of energy.14
Consistent with the terms of the Paris Agreement, the withdrawal will take effect on
November 4, 2020, one year after the date of notice of withdrawal.15 As a matter of international law, the United States could rejoin the Paris Agreement at any point thereafter, following a thirty-day waiting period.16 The United States remains a party to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change.17
The U.S. notiﬁcation of withdrawal was met with international regret. China and France
issued a joint declaration “reafﬁrm[ing] their strong support for the Paris Agreement, which
they consider an irreversible process and a compass for strong action on the climate,”18 and
11

Trump Statement of June 2017, supra note 10, at 2.
Paris Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 28(1); see Paris Agreement Depositary Notiﬁcation, Entry into Force,
supra note 4 (noting the Paris Agreement’s entry into force on November 4, 2016).
13
Depositary Notiﬁcation, Sec’y-Gen. of UN, Paris Agreement, Paris, Dec.12, 2015, United States of America:
Withdrawal (Nov. 4, 2019), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2019/CN.575.2019-Eng.
pdf [hereinafter Paris Agreement Depository Notiﬁcation, U.S. Withdrawal].
14
U.S. State Dep’t Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), available at https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement
[https://perma.cc/B9TP-B294].
15
Paris Agreement Depositary Notiﬁcation, U.S. Withdrawal, supra note 13; see also Paris Agreement, supra
note 1, Art. 28(2) (noting the one-year waiting period after the formal notiﬁcation of withdrawal).
16
See Paris Agreement, supra note 1, Art. 21(3) (providing that nations can continue to join the Paris
Agreement after its initial entry into force and that, for such a nation, “this Agreement shall enter into force on
the thirtieth day after the date of deposit . . . of [that nation’s] instrument of ratiﬁcation, acceptance, approval, or
accession”).
17
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1771 UNTS 707 (May 9, 1992), at https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7&chapter=27&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_
en [https://perma.cc/L927-SJUC].
18
China, France Reafﬁrm Support of Paris Climate Agreement, Call It “Irreversible,” REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2019), at
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-france-paris-agreement/china-france-reafﬁrm-support-of-paris-climate-agreement-call-it-irreversible-idUSKBN1XG0QJ; Accord Appel de Pékin sur la Conservation de la Biodiversité
et le Changement Climatique, ÉLYSÉE (Nov. 6, 2019), at https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2019/11/06/
12
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some other countries similarly emphasized their continued commitment to the Paris
Agreement.19 Likewise, the European Commission reiterated that the Paris Agreement “is
here to stay, its door remains open and we hope the U.S. will decide to pass it again one
day.”20 The spokesperson for the United Nations secretary-general stated that “our determination to move forward on the implementation of the Paris Agreement remains unchanged”
and “encourage[d] member states to actively engage . . . to raise ambition, to tackle and defeat
climate change.”21
Domestically, the U.S. notiﬁcation of withdrawal highlighted the strong divergence
between the U.S. government and numerous subnational governments with respect to the
issue of climate. Immediately after the U.S. notiﬁcation, a bipartisan coalition of twentyﬁve state governors “reafﬁrm[ed] our commitment to supporting climate action and . . .
strongly oppos[ed] the Administration’s decision to formally withdraw from the Paris
Agreement.”22 They noted that since June 2017, “our states have adopted or strengthened
29 greenhouse gas reduction targets and ramped up zero-carbon power generation, with 19
states now enacting or pursuing goals for 100 percent carbon-free or clean power by 2030 or
later.”23 In this same time period, a sizeable number of states and major cities have challenged
the Trump administration’s domestic climate actions, including by ﬁling lawsuits contesting
its rollback of the Clean Power Plan24 and energy-efﬁciency standards.25
California has been a leader in these subnational attempts to address climate change and
has consequently itself faced resistance from the Trump administration. In September 2019,
the Trump administration revoked California’s authority to set stricter vehicle emissions

appel-de-pekin-sur-la-conservation-de-la-biodiversite-et-le-changement-climatique [https://perma.cc/D85BEGNN]; see also Chinese Foreign Ministry Press Release, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng
Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on November 5, 2019 (Nov. 5, 2019), at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1713475.shtml [https://perma.cc/GKB6-NSHP] (“China regrets that
the US began the process to withdraw from the Paris Agreement . . . . We support the Paris Agreement, actively
fulﬁll our international obligations that are consistent with our development stage and national condition, and take
policy actions on climate change.”).
19
See, e.g., EU Hopes US Will Rethink Choice to Pull out of Climate Pact, AP NEWS (Nov. 5, 2019), at https://
apnews.com/f81a25b839324e578641946c358c22ec (quoting German Environment Minister Svenja Schulze as
calling the U.S. withdrawal “regrettable” and noting that “[t]he rest of the world stands together on climate protection”); Rossella Tercatin, Israel Reafﬁrms Its Commitment to Paris Agreement, JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 6, 2019), at
https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Israel-reafﬁrms-its-commitment-to-Paris-Agreement-607032 (quoting
Israeli Environmental Protection Minister Zeev Elkin as saying, “The decision made by the United States to withdraw from the Paris Agreement will not lead us to withdraw from it as well”).
20
European Commission (@EU_Commission), TWITTER (Nov. 5, 2019, 5:32 AM), at https://twitter.com/
EU_Commission/status/1191709918094598145?s=20 [https://perma.cc/B5WX-XLMC].
21
UN/US Paris Agreement Reax, UN Audiovisual Library (Nov. 5, 2019), at https://www.unmultimedia.org/
avlibrary/asset/2494/2494475/ [https://perma.cc/78QW-QSAB].
22
U.S. Climate All. Press Release, U.S. Climate Alliance Governors Oppose Administration’s Withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019), at http://www.usclimatealliance.org/publications/pariswithdrawal [http://
perma.cc/M2V9-59QV].
23
Id.
24
Petition for Review, New York v. EPA, No. 19-1019 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 2019), available at https://oag.ca.
gov/system/ﬁles/attachments/press-docs/2019%2008%2013%20ﬁnal%20petition%20for%20review.pdf.
25
Petition for Review, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, No. 19-____ (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 2019), available at
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/2019_11_04_petition_for_review_gsl_deﬁnition_rule_withdrawal_ﬁnal.
pdf.
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standards than those established under federal law,26 leading California—along with twentytwo other states, the District of Columbia, and two cities—to sue the administration over this
revocation.27 In the latest salvo, on October 23, 2019, the United States ﬁled a lawsuit against
California, alleging that the cap-and-trade agreement between California and Quebec,
Canada, is unconstitutional.28 This agreement “link[s]” California and Quebec’s pre-existing
cap-and-trade programs29 by allowing regulated entities in California and Quebec to trade
their emissions allowances with each other.30 In challenging this agreement, the United
States alleges that it is “an independent foreign policy in the area of greenhouse gas regulation”
which “intrude[s] into the federal sphere,” “complexif[ying] and burden[ing] the United
States’ task . . . of negotiating competitive international agreements.”31 In response, the governor of California described this lawsuit as a “political vendetta against California, our climate policies and the health of our communities,” adding that “the Trump administration’s
abysmal record of denying climate change and propping up big polluters makes cross-border
collaboration all the more necessary.”32 The case is pending before a federal district judge in
the Eastern District of California.33

26

See generally The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efﬁcient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program, 84
Fed. Reg. 51,310 (Sept. 27, 2019).
27
Complaint, California v. Chao, No. 19-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019), available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/ﬁles/attachments/press_releases/California%20v.%20Chao%20complaint%20%2800000002%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7FG2-YRVJ].
28
Complaint, United States v. California, No. 19-2142 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2019), available at https://www.
justice.gov/opa/press-release/ﬁle/1212416/download [https://perma.cc/M3TW-RQGZ] [hereinafter Complaint];
see also Amended Complaint, United States v. California, No. 19-2142 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019).
29
Cal. Air Res. Bd., Linkage, at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/linkage.htm [perma.cc/JKN3UG6G].
30
Cal. Air Res. Bd., Agreement on the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade Programs for
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Art. 7, available at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/
2017_linkage_agreement_ca-qc-on.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJC4-N5ZR]. This agreement was made in 2017,
updating an earlier one from 2013. See Cal. Air Res. Bd., Agreement Between the California Air Resources
Board and the Gouvernement du Québec Concerning the Harmonization and Integration of Cap-and-Trade
Programs for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions, available at https://ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/linkage/ca_quebec_linking_agreement_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/72LK-E584].
31
Complaint, supra note 28, para. 3.
32
Governor of Cal. Press Release, Governor Newsom Statement on Trump Administration’s Attack on
California’s Landmark Cap-and-Trade Program (Oct. 23, 2019), at https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/10/23/governor-newsom-statement-on-trump-administrations-attack-on-californias-landmark-cap-and-trade-program
[https://perma.cc/9FBY-CCTN].
33
See Stipulation and [Proposed] Order Extending Time for Defendants to Respond to Complaint or Amended
Complaint, United States v. California, No. 19-2142 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2019) (requesting, with the joint agreement of the parties, that California have until January 6, 2020, to ﬁle an answer or a motion to dismiss).
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Trump Administration Continues Trade Negotiations with Major Trade Partners
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.83

In the fall of 2019, the Trump administration reached several trade arrangements, some of
them tentative, with important U.S. trade partners. On October 11, 2019, China and the
United States announced a preliminary trade deal subject to ﬁnalization—one that came
after more than a year of escalating tariffs. Just a week earlier, the United States had signed
two trade agreements with Japan, one regarding tariff reductions and the other regarding digital trade. None of these deals appear to require subsequent congressional approval in the eyes
of the executive branch, unlike the earlier United States-Mexico-Canada-Agreement
(USMCA), which was signed in November 2018 and whose fate in Congress appears promising as of mid-December of 2019. In addition to these trade arrangements, the fall of 2019
saw several developments in trade relations between the United States and the European
Union tied to the long-running trade disputes.
In March of 2018, the U.S. Ofﬁce of the Trade Representative (USTR) issued a report
concluding that China was engaged in certain unfair trade practices.1 Over the next year
and a half, the two countries engaged in dizzying exchanges of tariffs and counter-tariffs.
Continuing this trend in early August of 2019, the Trump administration announced that
an additional 10 percent tariff on $300 billion of goods would go into effect on September 1
and December 15, 2019.2 In response, China announced it would raise tariffs on various
products, including soybeans, pork, and corn.3 Soon after, President Trump tweeted that
American companies should “immediately start looking for an alternative to China, including
bringing . . . [their] companies HOME and making [their] products in the USA.”4 The same
day, the Trump administration announced that it would increase the tariffs that were planned
1
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES
RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE
TRADE ACT OF 1974 (2018). For discussion of this investigation, its aftermath, and the legal landscape underlying
subsequent tariffs, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 505 (2018);
Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 751 (2018).
2
See Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USTR Announces Next Steps on Proposed 10 Percent Tariff
on Imports from China (Aug. 13, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/
2019/august/ustr-announces-next-steps-proposed [https://perma.cc/B99V-27EY]; see also Jean Galbraith,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 822, 830 (2019).
3
See Alan Rappeport & Keith Bradsher, Trump Says He Will Raise Existing Tariffs on Chinese Goods to 30%,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/23/business/china-tariffs-trump.html?
module=inline.
4
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Aug. 23, 2019, 7:59 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1164914960046133249 [https://perma.cc/H643-NNVR]. Trump declared that he
would have the power to prohibit U.S. companies from continuing business in China pursuant to the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER
(Aug. 23, 2019, 8:58 PM), at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1165111122510237696 [https://
perma.cc/2L87-TCTQ]; but see Joshua Geltzer, Blame Trump, Not the U.S. Code, for His Abuse of Emergency
Authority, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 26, 2019), at https://www.justsecurity.org/65978/blame-trump-not-the-u-scode-for-his-abuse-of-emergency-authority (arguing that if “Trump in fact invokes the IEEPA to restrict
American commercial activity in China, he’ll be . . . violating federal law” and expressing the hope that courts
would “reject Trump’s overreach”).
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to take effect in September and December by 5 percent, as well as increasing another, preexisting set of tariffs by 5 percent on October 1.5
In September, however, signs of a thaw emerged. Pending high-level negotiations, China
eliminated a small number of U.S. products from being subject to its tariffs, while Trump
authorized a two-week delay of the 5 percent tariff increase that was supposed to go into effect
on October 1 “as a gesture of good will.”6
On October 11, 2019, President Trump announced that a “phase one” deal had been
reached with China, “subject to getting written” at a later date.7 As announced at that
time, the deal included commitments by China to purchase $40 to $50 billion of U.S. agricultural products annually, to make its markets more accessible to U.S. ﬁnancial ﬁrms, and to
have greater foreign exchange market transparency.8 During the announcement, Trump and
his advisors noted that the United States would further delay the implementation of the
October tariff increases, although they were not clear about whether the tariffs planned for
December would continue as scheduled.9
Further negotiations ensued and, on December 13, 2019, the United States and China
stated that they had ﬁnalized their agreement.10 According to news reports, China committed
to a sizeable increase in its purchase of agricultural products.11 The United States agreed to
cut the tariffs imposed in September 2019 down to 7.5% and to cancel the December tariffs.
As of mid-December of 2019, the text of the agreement has not been released and was reportedly awaiting ﬁnal reﬁnement.12
Trump has stated that this deal will be one which does not require the subsequent approval
of Congress as a matter of U.S. domestic law,13 perhaps because the main U.S. concession will
5
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USTR Statement on Section 301 Tariff Action Regarding China
(Aug. 23, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2019/august/ustr-statement-section-301-tariff [https://perma.cc/PSE2-7URS].
6
See Alexandra Stevenson, China Lifts Tariffs on Some U.S. Goods in Modest Olive Branch to Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 11, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/business/china-drops-tariffs.html?module=inline
(reporting that China “publish[ed] a short list of products to be spared from retaliatory tariffs on Americanmade goods”); Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 11, 2019, 4:17 PM), at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1171925717988388865 [https://perma.cc/34KF-3CTP].
7
Donald J. Trump, Remarks in a Meeting with Vice Premier Liu He of China and an Exchange with Reporters,
2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 713, at 1 (Oct. 11) [hereinafter Trump and Liu Joint Statement]. With respect
to enforcement, Trump stated that there would be an enforcement provision and U.S. Trade Representative
Robert E. Lighthizer noted that there would be “a very elaborate consultation process.” Id. at 5.
8
See id. at 2, 11 (also quoting Secretary of the Treasury Mnuchin as saying with respect to the U.S. agricultural
exports that these would “scale up to an annual ﬁgure” of $40 to $50 billion within two years). This would be a
large increase compared to current exports. See Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep., The People’s Republic of China, at
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china [https://perma.cc/T9562TUZ] (“U.S. total exports of agricultural products to China totaled $9.3 billion in 2018.”).
9
Trump and Liu Joint Statement, supra note 7, at 7. The September 1 tariffs had already gone into effect, and
the Trump administration made no statement about withdrawing those tariffs. See generally id. (lacking any mention of the September 1 tariffs); 84 Fed. Reg. 57145 (Oct. 24, 2019) (noting the tariffs originally noticed on
August 20, 2019 were “effective September 1, 2019”).
10
Alan Rappeport, Ana Swanson, Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, U.S. and China Reach Initial Trade Deal,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/13/business/economy/china-trade-deal.
html.
11
Id.
12
Id. (observing that the text “still needs to be translated, scrubbed and signed”).
13
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 11, 2019, 7:15 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1182661081849835520 [https://perma.cc/6T4R-ZT55] (“One of the great things
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be the rollback of tariffs, which the executive branch has the authority to undertake under
preexisting congressional law.14 Trump has stated that after the completion of “phase
one,” the United States and China will turn to “phase two” and negotiate further with respect
to intellectual property, technology transfers, and possibly other issues.15
Shortly before the October announcement of the “phase one” deal with China, the United
States signed two trade agreements with Japan. Early in the Trump administration, trade talks
between the United States and Japan had been at a standstill following President Trump’s
2017 decision that the United States would not become a party to the Trans-Paciﬁc
Partnership (TPP).16 In the fall of 2018, however, Japan agreed to begin negotiations on a new
bilateral trade agreement, and the Trump administration notiﬁed Congress of the start of these
negotiations.17 During the G-7 summit in France in August of 2019, Trump declared that the two
countries were “fairly close” to completing “a major deal.”18 Several weeks later, on September 16,
Trump relayed to Congress his intention to enter into two agreements with Japan: an “initial trade
agreement” concerning tariffs and an “Executive Agreement” concerning digital trade.19 These
agreements were ﬁnalized on September 25 and signed on October 7.20
The agreement on tariffs provides that both parties will lower certain tariffs over time.
A USTR press release states that “[o]nce this agreement is implemented, over 90 percent
of U.S. food and agricultural products imported into Japan will either be duty free or receive
preferential tariff access.”21 In exchange, the United States has agreed to eliminate or reduce
tariffs for agricultural products “such as certain perennial plants and cut ﬂowers, persimmons,
green tea, chewing gum, and soy sauce,” as well as a number of industrial goods including
about the China Deal is the fact that, for various reasons, we do not have to go through the very long and politically
complex Congressional Approval Process”).
14
See Kevin Breuninger, Trump Says the US Has Come to a Substantial Phase One Deal with China, CNBC (Oct.
11, 2019), at https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/11/trump-says-us-has-come-to-a-substantial-phase-one-dealwith-china.html (quoting a commentator offering reasoning along these lines).
15
Trump and Liu Joint Statement, supra note 7, at 2.
16
See Motoko Rich, Japan’s Embrace of Bilateral Trade Talks with U.S. Spares It from Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/27/world/asia/japan-trump-trade-talks-auto-tariffs.html.
17
See White House Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Is Strengthening Ties, Improving Trade, and
Deepening Our Global Partnership with Japan (Apr. 26, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/president-donald-j-trump-strengthening-ties-improving-trade-deepening-global-partnership-japan
[https://perma.cc/BH8Z-QZFH]; Letters from Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Representative, to
Charles E. Schumer, U.S. Senate Minority Leader, et al. (Oct. 16, 2018), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/ﬁles/20181017004828790-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZC3-8HV6].
18
Donald J. Trump, Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan and an Exchange
with Reporters in Biarritz, France, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 570, at 2 (Aug. 25).
19
See Donald J. Trump, Message to the Congress on Notiﬁcation of Initiation of the United States-Japan Trade
Agreement, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 623, at 1 (Sept. 16) (noting the administration was “pursuing
negotiations with Japan in stages” in order to “achieve a comprehensive trade agreement”).
20
Donald J. Trump, Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan in New York City,
2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 660, at 1 (Sept. 25) [hereinafter Trump and Abe Joint Statement]; Ofﬁce of
the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement Text, at https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japan-korea-apec/
japan/us-japan-trade-agreement-negotiations/us-japan-trade-agreement-text [https://perma.cc/2QQH-DE9K];
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep., U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement Text, at https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/japankorea-apec/japan/us-japan-trade-agreement-negotiations/us-japan-digital-trade-agreement-text [https://perma.
cc/YYM6-LJHB].
21
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, Fact Sheet on U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement (Oct. 7, 2019), at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/fact-sheets/2019/september/fact-sheet-us-japan-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/A79Q-2YYU].
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“machine tools, fasteners, steam turbines, bicycles, bicycle parts, and musical instruments.”22
The digital trade agreement, which the USTR described as “meet[ing] the gold standard on
digital trade rules set by the USMCA,” includes a host of provisions, including “barrier-free
cross-border data transfers,” and prohibitions “on imposing customs duties on digital products transmitted electronically such as videos, music, e-books, software, and games.”23 The
terms of both agreements have considerable but not complete similarity to a subset of provisions from the earlier TPP.24
By having two separate trade agreements, rather than a combined one, the Trump administration was able to invoke statutory authority for one of the agreements. Section 103(a) of
the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 authorizes the
president to “enter into trade agreements with foreign countries” where these agreements are
limited to certain adjustments to tariffs.25 Trump invoked this section by name in notifying
Congress of his intent to enter into the agreement on tariffs with Japan.26 With respect to the
digital trade agreement, the Trump administration’s notiﬁcation to Congress did not specify
any statutory authority authorizing this agreement, instead simply describing it as an
“Executive Agreement.”27 In past administrations, the USTR and other executive branch
actors have taken the position that certain internationally legally binding trade agreements
do not require congressional approval.28 The assumption as of fall 2019 is that both agreements with Japan will enter into force on January 1, 2020.29
Trump characterized the agreement on tariffs as “a tremendous trade deal” and remarked
that negotiations for “phase two” are already underway.30 The next phase will likely relate to
U.S. imports of Japanese automobiles, the further entry of U.S. service providers into the
Japanese markets, and the regulation of currency exchange rates.31 At least pending the
22

Id.
Id.
24
See id.; U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement a “Cheap Imitation” of TPP: Sen. Carper, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2019), at
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2019-09-26/u-s-japan-trade-agreement-a-cheap-imitation-of-tppsen-carper-video (quoting a Democratic senator to the effect that the negotiations had resulted in a “cheap imitation” of the TPP); David Lawder, U.S.-Japan Trade Deal Versus TPP: Where It Falls Short, Where It Exceeds,
REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2019), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-japan/u-s-japan-trade-deal-versus-tppwhere-it-falls-short-where-it-exceeds-idUSKBN1WM0A3 (noting various similarities while observing that the
TPP provided for broader tariff reduction but less comprehensive commitments with respect to digital trade).
25
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, § 103(a),
129 Stat. 320, 333 (setting forth an authorization that will sunset and thus not apply to agreements reached after
July 1, 2021).
26
Message to the Congress on Notiﬁcation of Initiation of the United States-Japan Trade Agreement, supra
note 19.
27
Id.
28
See Jean Galbraith, International Law and the Domestic Separation of Powers, 99 VA. L. REV. 987, 1037–42
(2013) (describing how, during the ﬁrst term of the Obama administration, executive branch ofﬁcials concluded
that congressional approval was not needed for the United States to join the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade
Agreement, although this position was disputed by some scholars and members of Congress).
29
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11120, U.S.-JAPAN TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 1 (2019). Japan’s Diet
approved both agreements towards the end of 2019. See Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release,
Ambassador Lighthizer Lauds Japan’s Approval of the U.S.-Japan Digital Trade Agreement (Dec. 4, 2019), at
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2019/december/ambassador-lighthizer-laudsjapan [https://perma.cc/8479-R8DY].
30
Trump and Abe Joint Statement, supra note 20, at 1.
31
See Ana Swanson, Trump Announces a Trade Pact with Japan, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), at https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/09/25/business/trump-announces-limited-trade-pact-with-japan.html (“[A Japanese chief
23
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completion of this second phase, some have “question[ed] the extent to which [the initial
agreement on tariffs] adheres to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) under the [World Trade Organization (WTO)] that requires [Free Trade
Agreements] cover ‘substantially all trade,’ in particular given the exclusion of auto trade.”32
In seeking to structure the trade deals with China and Japan so as to bypass the need for
subsequent congressional approval, the Trump administration is likely conscious of its experience seeking congressional approval for the USMCA. This renegotiation of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed on November 30, 2018.33 By the end of
November of 2019, however, only Mexico had received the legislative approval necessary to
effectuate it.34 In the United States, the fate of the USMCA in Congress appeared uncertain
throughout the fall of 2019. On May 30, 2019, the USTR submitted “a draft Statement of
Administrative Action (SAA) to implement the [USMCA] and a copy of the ﬁnal legal text
as it now stands.”35 On December 13, 2019, the implementing legislation itself was submitted
for congressional consideration, triggering a fast-track process for an up-or-down vote.36
Before triggering this process, the Trump administration had undertaken negotiations with
Congress—and particularly with the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives—in order
to increase the likelihood that the USMCA will be approved. This also required re-opening certain issues with Canada and Mexico. In a major breakthrough in these negotiations in early
December of 2019, the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi announced support for a modiﬁed
version of the USMCA, one whose changes strengthened compliance mechanisms for the labor
and environmental provisions, while reducing intellectual property protections for certain kinds
of pharmaceuticals.37 Immediately afterward, lead negotiators for Canada, Mexico, and the
United States signed a revised version of the USMCA incorporating these changes.38 On

negotiator, Atsuyuki] Oike added . . . that the two sides would discuss a reduction in the United States’ 2.5 percent
tariff on imported passenger cars in their next round of talks.”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 29, at 2 (listing
“Motor Vehicles,” “Services,” and “Currency” as “Potential Provisions in Future Talks”).
32
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 29, at 2 (noting that while “adherence to Article XXIV has rarely been
challenged at the WTO, whether or not the U.S.-Japan deal violates the letter or spirit of this WTO requirement
likely depends on the timeline and scope of the next stage talks”).
33
See Protocol Replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement with the Agreement Between the United
States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/USMCA_Protocol.pdf. For a detailed discussion of the notable differences between
NAFTA and USMCA, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 150 (2019).
34
On June 19, 2019, Mexico overwhelmingly approved the USMCA. See LXIV Legislatura: Periodo
Extraordinario Primer Año de Ejercicio, SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA, at http://www.senado.gob.mx/64/ votacion/
3417 [https://perma.cc/V8J9-K8PY] (showing a Senate vote of 114 to 4 in favor of the trade agreement).
Although the Canadian Parliament began its process in May, it was dissolved prior to completing this process
and, as a result, its implementation act must be reintroduced in the next parliamentary session.
35
Message from U.S. Trade Representative Robert E. Lighthizer to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, at 1
(May 30, 2019). This submission must be made to Congress at least thirty days before submitting an implementing bill. 19 U.S.C. § 4205(a)(1)(D)–(E).
36
White House Sends USMCA Implementing Bill to Congress, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Dec. 13, 2019), at https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/white-house-sends-usmca-implementing-bill-congress.
37
See Speaker of the House Press Release, Transcript of Speaker Pelosi Press Conference Announcing New
USMCA Agreement (Dec. 10, 2019), at https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/121019-2.
38
Natalie Andrews & William Mauldin, Revised Trade Pact Set for Likely Approval by Congress in 2020, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2019), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/house-democrats-reach-agreement-with-trump-administration-on-usmca-trade-deal-11575989670.
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December 19, 2019, this implementing legislation passed the House of Representatives by a
vote of 385–41, and its prospects of passing the Senate in early 2020 are promising.39
In contrast to the indications of progress with respect to trade deals with China, Japan,
Mexico, and Canada, trade relations between the United States and the European Union
saw mixed developments during the fall of 2019. On August 2, 2019, the United States
and the European Union did sign an agreement that increased the quantity of hormonefree U.S. beef that could be exported duty-free to the European Union.40 In contrast, another
ongoing dispute escalated—this one over countermeasures in response to unlawful subsidies
to aircraft manufacturers. On October 18, 2019, after getting approval from the World Trade
Organization, the United States imposed tariffs on $7.5 billion worth of European goods as a
countermeasure for EU subsidies to Airbus.41 The United States undertook this step notwithstanding the fact that it has been found in violation of international trade law with respect to
U.S. subsidies to Boeing and that, before too long, the WTO will presumably also authorize
the EU to impose major tariffs as countermeasures.42 In response, EU Commissioner for
Trade Cecilia Malmström characterized the U.S. tariffs as “short-sighted and counterproductive” and declared that, upon WTO authorization, the European Union would “have no
other option” in the absence of a settlement other than to respond with tariffs.43

39

Emily Cochrane & Ana Swanson, Revised North American Trade Pact Passes House, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/us/politics/usmca-deal.html.
40
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, United States and European Union Sign Breakthrough
Agreement on U.S. Beef Access to EU (Aug. 28, 2019), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/
press-releases/2019/august/united-states-and-european-union [https://perma.cc/V4GA-QULB]; The European
Union and the United States Sign an Agreement on Imports of Hormone-Free Beef, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, at
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_5010 [https://perma.cc/WTT4-E79Y] (also noting the need for future approval from the European Parliament).
41
European Commission Press Release, Statement by Commissioner for Trade Cecilia Malmström on U.S.
Countermeasures in Airbus Dispute, at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2075 [https://
perma.cc/U7XN-HWWB]; James McAuley, Trump’s Proposed Cheese and Wine Tariffs Rile Europeans, WASH.
POST (Oct. 3, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe-decries-proposed-us-tariffs-on-frenchwine-italian-cheese-and-other-products/2019/10/03/2dab6dd9-89fb-403c-8f1d-77edd5cd29db_story.html; see
also Recourse to Article 22.5 of the DSU by the European Union: Decision by the Arbitrator, European
Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WTO Doc.
WT/DS316/ARB (ﬁnding the European Union had broken certain global trade rules by providing subsidies to
Airbus, damaging the United States annually by approximately $7.5 billion).
42
See European Commission Press Release, Statement on the Publication of WTO’s Award in the Airbus
Dispute, at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2068 [https://perma.cc/RW7T-GUX5];
European Commission Press Release, EU Scores Final Victory in the WTO Boeing Dispute, at https://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1999&title=EU-scores-ﬁnal-victory-in-the-WTO-Boeing-dispute
[https://perma.cc/4GP6-JBB7].
43
See Statement on the Publication of the WTO’s Award in the Airbus Dispute, supra note 42 (stating that
“[o]ur readiness to ﬁnd a fair settlement remains unchanged”); David J. Lynch, U.S. Can Impose Tariffs on $7.5
Billion in Goods Because E.U. Gave Illegal Subsidies to Airbus, WTO Rules, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2019), at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-united-states-can-impose-tariffs-on-75-billion-in-goodsbecause-european-union-gave-illegal-subsidies-to-airbus-wto-rules/2019/10/02/021edc06-e51d-11e9-b403f738899982d2_story.html (quoting a senior USTR ofﬁcial as saying the EU proposals were “not sufﬁcient”).
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USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
United States Withdraws Troops from Syria, Leaving Kurds Vulnerable
doi:10.1017/ajil.2019.81

Political instability and violence escalated in northeastern Syria in October 2019, following
President Trump’s decision to withdraw most U.S. troops from the country. Trump’s decision left U.S.-backed Kurdish forces vulnerable to attacks by Turkey, intensifying an already
dire humanitarian situation. Soon thereafter, Kurdish leaders negotiated an agreement with
the Russian-backed Syrian government to ﬁll the vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal. By late
October, the president of Turkey agreed to a ceaseﬁre in response to diplomatic and economic
pressure from the United States and to the arrival of Russian and Syrian troops into northeastern Syria. Shortly thereafter, U.S. forces carried out a raid in northwestern Syria that
resulted in the death of the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—a
raid that relied in part on intelligence gathered earlier by Kurdish allies.
Since 2016, American Special Operation troops have been on the ground ﬁghting alongside the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-led militia, in an effort to defeat ISIL.1 On
December 19, 2018, Trump abruptly announced that the United States would withdraw
entirely from Syria in light of the territorial defeat of ISIL, but he scaled back this decision
after receiving bipartisan criticism from Congress and signiﬁcant opposition from executive
branch ofﬁcials.2 In the months following this announcement, Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan repeatedly threatened that Turkey would launch military operations into
Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria.3
In August of 2019, the United States and Turkey moved forward with the creation of a
“safe zone” in northeastern Syria. The American embassy in Turkey explained that they had
agreed on:
(a) the rapid implementation of initial measures to address Turkey’s security concerns;
(b) to stand-up a joint operations center in Turkey as soon as possible in order to coordinate and manage the establishment of the safe zone together;
(c) that the safe zone shall become a peace corridor, and every effort shall be made so that
displaced Syrians can return to their country.4
1
See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 394, 395 (2019) (also noting that
the United States ﬁrst entered the conﬂict in Syria in 2014). The Obama administration asserted domestic legal
authority for using force in Syria based on the 2001 and 2002 Authorizations for Use of Military Force and claimed
an international right to use force to respond in self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to
threats posed by ISIL. Id. at 394.
2
Id. at 397–99.
3
Sarah Dadouch, Turkey to Launch Offensive in Kurdish-Controlled Area in Northern Syria: Erdoğan, REUTERS (Aug.
4, 2019), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-turkey/turkey-to-launch-offensive-in-kurdishcontrolled-area-in-northern-syria-erdogan-idUSKCN1UU0GS. The Turkish government views Kurdish forces
within Syria as closely connected with Kurdish separatists within Turkey, whom it considers terrorists. See Rod
Nordland, U.S. Exit Seen as a Betrayal of the Kurds, and a Boon for ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), at https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/world/middleeast/syria-kurds-isis-us.html.
4
U.S. Mission Turkey, Statement on Joint Military Talks Regarding Syria (Aug. 7, 2019), at https://tr.usembassy.gov/statement-on-joint-military-talks-regarding-syria [https://perma.cc/D654-AN5Z].
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In the following month, U.S. troops worked with the Syrian Democratic Forces to remove
their trenches and other military barriers within the safe zone.5
Notwithstanding this development, Erdoğan informed Trump on October 6 of Turkey’s
intention to invade northeastern Syria.6 The White House press secretary summarized the
phone call as follows:
Turkey will soon be moving forward with its long-planned operation into Northern
Syria. The United States Armed Forces will not support or be involved in the operation,
and United States forces, having defeated the [ISIL] territorial “Caliphate,” will no longer
be in the immediate area . . . . Turkey will now be responsible for all [ISIL] ﬁghters in the
area captured over the past two years in the wake of the defeat of the territorial
“Caliphate” by the United States.7
The next morning, Trump tweeted his wish to “get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars . . .
and bring our soldiers home” and stated that other actors in the region would “have to ﬁgure
the situation out.”8 Trump’s tacit acceptance of Turkey’s planned advance into northern
Syria and his promise to “get out” of the area drew sharp criticism from former Trump administration ofﬁcials, congressional leaders, and European allies.9 Within a week, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed a resolution expressing opposition to Trump’s decision by a vote of
354 to 60.10 Kurdish leaders, including Syrian Democratic Forces commander General
Mazloum Kobane Abdi, responded to their abandonment by U.S. allies with dismay.11
On October 9, Turkey launched its offensive into northeastern Syria, conducting air
strikes and sending ground troops across the border.12 Turkey informed the UN Security
Council by letter that it was invoking its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter to “target terrorists and their hideouts, shelters, emplacements, weapons, vehicles

Sarah El Deeb, Turkey, US Conduct “Safe Zone” Joint Patrols in North Syria, AP NEWS (Sept. 8, 2019), at
https://apnews.com/b6e7c9b282844b92bed9a2e5bc7703d9.
6
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (Oct. 6, 2019), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-85 [https://perma.cc/4SS8-WTQC].
7
Id.
8
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2019, 7:40 AM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1181172457811697664 [https://perma.cc/XH8R-FLC3].
9
See Peter Baker & Lara Jakes, Trump Throws Middle East Policy Into Turmoil Over Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7,
2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/turkey-syria-trump.html; James McAuley & Rick
Noack, Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Northern Syria Angers, Worries Europeans, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2019),
at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/trumps-pullout-of-us-troops-from-northern-syria-angersworries-europeans/2019/10/07/7a2c89f2-e8fe-11e9-85c0-85a098e47b37_story.html; Eric Schmitt, Maggie
Haberman & Edward Wong, President Endorses Turkish Military Operation in Syria, Shifting U.S. Policy, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/07/us/politics/trump-turkey-syria.html.
10
H.R.J. Res. 77, 116th Cong. (2019).
11
Liz Sly, Sarah Dadouch & Asser Khattab, Syrian Kurds See American Betrayal and Warn Fight Against ISIS Is
Now in Doubt, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2019), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syriankurds-see-american-betrayal-and-warn-alliance-against-isis-is-now-in-doubt/2019/10/07/96c425da-e902-11e9a329-7378fbfa1b63_story.html (also quoting a statement from Syrian Kurdish leaders that “[t]o disregard our
partnership would also send a clear signal to all would-be partner forces of the United States that a U.S. alliance
may not be trustworthy”).
12
Turkey-Syria Border: All the Latest Updates, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 10, 2019), at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2019/10/turkey-syria-border-latest-updates-191008131745495.html.
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and equipment” and that, consistent with previous counter-terrorism operations, “Turkey’s
response will be proportionate, measured and responsible.”13
In an unconventional diplomatic letter dated the same day, Trump wrote to Erdoğan as
follows:
Let’s work out a good deal! You don’t want to be responsible for slaughtering thousands
of people, and I don’t want to be responsible for destroying the Turkish economy—and I
will . . . .
I have worked hard to solve some of your problems. Don’t let the world down. You can
make a great deal. General Mazloum is willing to negotiate with you, and he is willing to
make concessions that they would never have made in the past . . . .
History will look upon you favorably if you get this done the right and humane way.
It will look upon you forever as the devil if good things don’t happen. Don’t be a
tough guy. Don’t be a fool!14
In response to the Turkish offensive, Trump signed an executive order on October 14 that
authorized signiﬁcant sanctions against individuals and entities within the Turkish government involved in this offensive.15 The order also authorized secondary sanctions on foreign
banks doing business with such individuals or entities.16 That same day, the Department of
the Treasury designated two ministries and three senior Turkish government ofﬁcials as subject to these sanctions.17 The Treasury secretary stated that “[t]he United States is holding the
Turkish Government accountable for escalating violence by Turkish forces, endangering
innocent civilians, and destabilizing the region.”18 Separately, on October 15, the
Department of Justice indicted Halkbank, a Turkish state-owned bank, on fraud and
money laundering charges relating to the evasion of U.S. sanctions on Iran.19

13
Letter Dated 9 October 2019 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2019/804, at https://undocs.org/S/2019/804.
The European Parliament passed a resolution describing Turkey’s actions as “a grave violation of international
law” that “is undermining the stability and security of the region as a whole, bringing further suffering to people
already affected by war, causing the mass displacement of civilians, and could contribute to the re-emergence of
[ISIL].” Resolution on the Turkish Military Operation in Northeast Syria and Its Consequences, Eur. Parl. Doc.
2886(RSP) (2019), at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2019-0123_EN.html.
14
Read Trump’s Letter to President Erdoğan of Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2019), at https://www.nytimes.
com/interactive/2019/10/16/us/politics/trump-letter-turkey.html. That same day, Trump stated that the
United States was relocating “some of the most dangerous [detained ISIL] ﬁghters” out of the area. Donald J.
Trump, Remarks by President Trump at Signing of Executive Orders on Transparency in Federal Guidance
and Enforcement, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 705, at 7 (Oct. 9).
15
Exec. Order No. 13,894, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,851 (Oct. 14, 2019).
16
Id.
17
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury Press Release, Treasury Designates Turkish Ministries and Senior Ofﬁcials in
Response to Military Action in Syria (Oct. 14, 2019), at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm792
[https://perma.cc/NU5X-QULW].
18
Id.
19
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Turkish Bank Charged in Manhattan Federal Court for Its Participation
in a Multibillion-Dollar Iranian Sanctions Evasion Scheme (Oct. 15, 2019), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
turkish-bank-charged-manhattan-federal-court-its-participation-multibillion-dollar-iranian [https://perma.cc/
34FZ-XDF7].
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Also in response to the Turkish offensive, Kurdish forces reached a deal with the Russianbacked Syrian government on October 13 that would allow government forces to return to
northeastern Syria to combat Turkish military advances.20 Filling the vacuum left by the U.S.
withdrawal, Syrian government forces immediately moved in, along with Russian troops.21
On October 17, Vice President Pence led a delegation to Ankara, Turkey, in an attempt to
negotiate a ceaseﬁre with Erdoğan. After several hours of diplomatic discussions, Turkey agreed
to a ﬁve-day ceaseﬁre.22 The United States and Turkey issued a joint statement following the
meeting that outlined a thirteen-point agreement.23 This agreement included the following:
1. The US and Turkey reafﬁrm their relationship as fellow members of NATO. The
US understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns on Turkey’s southern border.
...
4. The two countries reiterate their pledge to uphold human life, human rights, and the
protection of religious and ethnic communities.
...
7. The Turkish side expressed its commitment to ensure safety and well-being of residents of all population centers in the safe zone controlled by the Turkish Forces
(safe zone) and reiterated that maximum care will be exercised in order not to
cause harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.
...
10. The safe zone will be primarily enforced by the Turkish Armed Forces and the two
sides will increase their cooperation in all dimensions of its implementation.
11. The Turkish side will pause Operation Peace Spring in order to allow the withdrawal
of [certain Syrian Kurdish forces] from the safe zone within 120 hours. Operation
Peace Spring will be halted upon completion of this withdrawal.
12. Once Operation Peace Spring is paused, the US agrees not to pursue further imposition of sanctions under the Executive Order of October 14, 2019 . . . . Once
Operation Peace Spring is halted as per paragraph 11 the current sanctions under
the aforementioned Executive Order shall be lifted.24
Five days later, on October 22, Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin reached an
agreement that their forces would share supervision over a strip of territory more than twenty
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miles wide running hundreds of miles along Syria’s northeastern border.25 The next day,
Trump announced a “permanent” ceaseﬁre by Turkey:
Early this morning, the government of Turkey informed my administration that they
would be stopping combat and their offensive in Syria, and making the ceaseﬁre
permanent. And it will indeed be permanent. However you would also deﬁne the
word “permanent” in that part of the world as somewhat questionable, we all understand
that. But I do believe it will be permanent.26
Trump accordingly instructed the secretary of the Treasury “to lift all sanctions imposed on
October 14 in response to Turkey’s original offensive moves against the Kurds in Syria’s
northeast border region.”27 Trump stated that this ceaseﬁre “validates our course of action
with Turkey that only a couple of weeks ago were scorned . . . .”28 He also made clear that
“a small number of U.S. troops will remain in the area where they have the oil. And we’re
going to be protecting it, and we’ll be deciding what we’re going to do with it in the future.”29
Several days later, Trump announced one further, signiﬁcant development stemming from
U.S. military operations in Syria. This was the death of ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,30
who died during a raid conducted by U.S. forces in northwestern Syria. Prior to this operation, Kurdish allies had tracked al-Baghdadi and provided information critical to the launch
of the attack.31 Although a spokesperson for the Kremlin declined to reveal whether the
United States had informed Russia of the operation in advance,32 Trump observed that
“[w]e had to ﬂy over certain Russia areas, Russia-held areas” and “Russia treated us great.”33
On November 13, Erdoğan met with Trump at the White House.34 At a joint press conference with Erdoğan, Trump stated:
25
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Today, the ceaseﬁre continues to hold. And I want to thank the President for his partnership and cooperation as we work to build a more stable, and peaceful, and prosperous
Middle East. We’ve assured each other that Turkey will continue to uphold what it’s
supposed to uphold. I’m a big fan of the President, I have to tell you that. And
I know that the ceaseﬁre, while complicated, is moving forward and moving forward
at a very rapid clip. There’s a lot of people that want to see that work after so many
decades and so many centuries, you might say.35
In his remarks, Erdoğan noted his plans to repatriate one million Syrian refugees into the safe
zone.36 Erdoğan had met several weeks earlier with UN Secretary-General António Guterres
to discuss this issue, and Guterres “stressed the basic principles relating to the voluntary, safe
and digniﬁed” return of refugees.37 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is
in the process of reviewing Erdoğan’s plan,38 which would involve settling Arab Syrians from
other regions within Syria into the largely Kurdish northeast.39 In early November, a senior
UN humanitarian advisor indicated that “localized heavy ﬁghting continues” in northeastern
Syria, where “recent displacements are compounding an already dire situation in which some
710,000 people were already displaced and approximately 1.8 million remain in need of
humanitarian assistance.”40
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